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NOTES
Rebuilding Trust? The Sand Creek Massacre and the
Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship in Flute v. United States

I. Introduction
“If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better
calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined.”1 At sunrise on
November 29, 1864, approximately 700 United States troops attacked and
massacred members of the Arapaho and Cheyenne Tribes camped at Sand
Creek in the Colorado Territory.2 After a congressional investigation, the
officers responsible resigned their commissions, and “the United States
entered into the Treaty of Little Arkansas,” which promised to pay
reparations to the survivors.3 But these reparations have never been paid.4
In Flute v. United States, descendants of those massacred at Sand Creek
brought suit, alleging the United States had acted as trustee of the promised
funds and was in breach of its trust obligations.5 The United States asserted
sovereign immunity,6 the case was dismissed,7 and the Supreme Court
subsequently denied certiorari.8
For reasons discussed below, the purported waiver of sovereign
immunity identified by the Plaintiffs in Flute was bound to fail. This Note
proposes an alternative waiver of sovereign immunity, focusing on the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. Part II outlines the legal
background of the federal-tribal trust relationship and the sovereign
immunity doctrine. Part III discusses the factual background of Flute and
analyzes the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning. Finally, Part IV identifies an
alternative waiver of sovereign immunity that could have been more
successful.

1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
2. Flute v. United States, 808 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
146 (2016).
3. Id. at 1237-38.
4. Id. at 1238.
5. Id. at 1238-39.
6. Flute v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1184 (D. Colo. 2014).
7. Id. at 1188.
8. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1234.
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II. The Law Before Flute v. United States
A. The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship
The federal-tribal trust relationship has its roots in common law9 and was
first articulated in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.10 There, the Supreme Court
determined that, because of the historical dependency of Indian tribes,
“[t]heir relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian.”11 This status of dependency brings with it both benefits and
burdens; the trust relationship provides a source of protection for the tribes
as well as a justification for overbearing and colonialist treatment.12 The
trust duties of the United States are enforceable through litigation,13 and
trust relationship claims were historically governed by general, common
law fiduciary principles.14 For example, in Coast Indian Community v.
United States, members of a tribal association sued the United States for
breach of trust after the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) conveyed a right-ofway across their reservation for an allegedly inadequate price.15 The
plaintiffs were never formally designated as beneficiaries,16 and the statute
authorizing the BIA to convey the land imposed no fiduciary obligation.17
Nevertheless, the court determined that a common-law trust relationship
existed and that the fiduciary duty had been breached.18
This reliance on common law principles changed with the Mitchell cases
in 1980, and courts have since focused on obligations imposed by treaty or

9. Brett J. Stavin, Comment, Responsible Remedies: Suggestions for Indian Tribes in
Trust Relationship Cases, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1743, 1744 (2012) (“The trust doctrine originally
developed through federal common law.”).
10. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 6 (1831).
11. Id. at 17. The phrase “ward to his guardian” has been used to demonstrate early
recognition of the federal-tribal trust relationship, but does not demonstrate a literal, legal
guardian-ward relationship. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
12. Stavin, supra note 9, at 1743 (citing WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF
THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 189 (2010)). For
example, in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court held that due to the Indians’
“relation of dependency,” Congress had the right to unilaterally “abrogate the provisions of
an Indian treaty.” 187 U.S. 553, 564, 566 (1903).
13. Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 493 (1937).
14. Stavin, supra note 9, at 1744.
15. Coast Indian Cmty. v. United States, 550 F.2d 639, 641 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
16. Id. at 645.
17. See 25 U.S.C. § 323 (2012).
18. Coast Indian Cmty., 550 F.2d at 653.
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statute.19 In Mitchell I, tribal members sought damages from the United
States for its alleged mismanagement of tribal timber resources.20 The tribe
argued that the General Allotment Act of 1887 created a trust relationship,
but the United States moved to dismiss, asserting that it had not waived
sovereign immunity.21 The General Allotment Act allotted tracts of lands to
individual Indians and provided that “the United States does and will hold
the land thus allotted, for the period of twenty-five years, in trust for the
sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been
made.”22 The court below determined that the Act imposed a fiduciary duty
on the United States and constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity for a
breach of that duty.23 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, however,
concluding that the Act created “only a limited trust relationship” that did
not impose fiduciary duties on the United States.24 The Court held that,
because the individual allottees occupied the land for personal use and had
the responsibility of managing the land, the United States had no fiduciary
obligation.25
Actual control of the land by the tribal member was the essential factor
in the Court’s decision. The Court looked to the legislative history of the
Act and concluded that the Act’s purpose was to prevent alienation of tribal
land and ensure that the allottees remained immune from state taxation.26
Because nothing in the statutory scheme envisioned United States control
over or management of the land, it created no fiduciary responsibility.27 The
Court noted in closing that “[a]ny right of the respondents to recover money
damages for Government mismanagement of timber resources must be
found in some source other than [the General Allotment] Act.”28
On remand, the tribal members found such a source. In Mitchell II, the
Court determined that a trust relationship arose from an amalgamation of

19. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II); United States v.
Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell I).
20. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 537.
21. Id. at 537-38.
22. Pub. L. No. 49-119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 348).
23. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 541.
24. Id. at 542.
25. Id. at 542-43.
26. Id. at 544.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 546.
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various statutes29 and the Indian Tucker Act.30 The Court’s analysis focused
on the “elaborate control” the United States assumed over forests and tribal
property.31 Unlike in Mitchell I, where the General Allotment Act did not
outline any governmental control over tribal property, in Mitchell II, the
Department of the Interior exercised daily supervision over the harvesting
and management of tribal timber.32 Another key element in finding a
fiduciary relationship was language in a timber statute, which provided that
timber sales must be based on the “needs and best interests of the Indian
owner.”33 Notably, the Court found that this fiduciary relationship existed
despite the statutes’ lack of express trust language:
[W]here the Federal Government takes on or has control or
supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary
relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or
properties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even though
nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute
(or other fundamental document) about a trust fund, or a trust or
fiduciary connection.34
Trust relationship cases applying the Mitchell analysis look to a relevant
statute or treaty and determine the amount of governmental control it
authorizes and envisions. For example, in United States v. Navajo Nation,
the Court examined the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA) and found that
it created no fiduciary obligation.35 The IMLA grants the Secretary of the
Interior authority to approve mining leases between tribes and private
entities on unallotted reservation land.36 Navajo Nation involved the
renegotiation of one of these leases between the Navajo and Peabody Coal
Company.37 The tribe had been receiving approximately 2% of gross
proceeds from the lease—substantially less than the 12.5% statutory
29. These included timber management statutes (25 U.S.C. §§ 406, 407, 466), statutes
governing road building and rights of way (25 U.S.C §§ 318, 323-325), and statutes
governing Indian funds and government fees (25 U.S.C §§ 162a, 413).
30. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 211-12 (1983) (citing Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1505).
31. Id. at 225.
32. Id. at 222.
33. Id. at 224.
34. Id. at 225 (quoting Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct.
Cl. 1980)).
35. 537 U.S. 488, 493 (2003).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 495.
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minimum required for similar leases on federal land—and the BIA issued
an opinion letter stating that the rate should be raised to 20%.38 Peabody
then filed an administrative appeal; while the appeal was pending, Peabody
representatives met privately with Interior Secretary Don Hodel.39 No tribal
representatives attended or were aware of this meeting.40 Predictably,
Secretary Hodel then drafted a memo stating that a decision on the appeal
was not imminent and that the parties should return to the bargaining
table.41 The Navajo ultimately settled on a 12.5% rate that Secretary Hodel
subsequently approved.42
The Court rejected the Navajo’s claim that the IMLA created a trust
relationship.43 It reached this conclusion by comparing the IMLA to the
statutory scheme in Mitchell I and contrasting it with the statutory scheme
in Mitchell II.44 Unlike in Mitchell II, where the United States assumed
elaborate control over tribal property for the benefit of the tribe, in Navajo
Nation, the Secretary of the Interior had no managerial role and was not
“expressly invested with responsibility” to ensure that the needs and
interests of the tribe were met.45 The Court placed no weight on the
Secretary’s “ex parte communications from Peabody” and instead looked
only to the relevant statute.46
Mitchell I, Mitchell II, and the line of cases that follow47 leave tribes with
a specific path to demonstrate a trust relationship: the tribe must identify a
source of substantive law, such as a statute or treaty, which imposes a clear
fiduciary obligation on the United States. This obligation does not require
express trust language in the treaty or statute; instead, it requires that the
government assume control over tribal property for tribal benefit.
B. United States’ Sovereign Immunity and 5 U.S.C. § 702
As a fundamental principle of sovereign immunity, the United States, as
a sovereign, is immune from suit unless it consents to being sued.48 This

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 496.
Id. at 497.
Id.
Id. at 497-98.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 507-08.
Id.
Id. at 510.
See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
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immunity also extends to injunctive relief.49 Courts will not infer a waiver
of sovereign immunity, but instead require an unequivocal expression.50
One such waiver of sovereign immunity is found in the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, which provides in pertinent part:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief
other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or
an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official
capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed
nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the
United States . . . .51
Section 702 is an express waiver of United States’ sovereign immunity
when an individual has suffered a legal wrong because of a federal agency’s
action, though the waiver is limited to suits in which the plaintiff seeks
relief other than monetary damages. Prior to its 1976 amendment, § 702
provided, “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”52 The amendment
sought to “broaden the avenues of judicial review” and, when applicable,
expressly eliminate sovereign immunity as a defense.53
The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision liberally and allowed
suit against the United States even when the relief sought has “monetary
aspects.”54 In Bowen v. Massachusetts, the Court determined that § 702
conferred federal jurisdiction over Massachusetts’s claim that the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS) improperly refused to reimburse the
state for Medicaid expenditures.55 Massachusetts sought injunctive relief
after HHS refused to reimburse over $6 million that the state had spent on
care facilities for the mentally ill.56 Although a successful outcome for the

49. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 182 (1956).
50. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
52. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 891-92 (1988) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-996,
at 19-20 (1976)).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 893.
55. Id. at 882-83.
56. Id. at 887-88.
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state would have resulted in a monetary payment, the Court concluded that
it was not an action for monetary damages.57 Monetary damages provide an
individual with compensation for an injury, while “the recovery of specific
property or monies” is an action for equitable relief.58 Accordingly, § 702
applied and the suit could proceed.59
Because an assertion of sovereign immunity is likely to appear at the
motion to dismiss stage in suits against the federal government,60 every
tribe in a breach of trust or breach of treaty action must be prepared with a
relevant waiver of sovereign immunity.
III. Flute v. United States
A. Factual History
The 1861 Treaty of Fort Wise ceded a tract of land on the Arkansas
River to the Arapaho and Cheyenne Tribes.61 Later, in 1864, Colorado
Territorial Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs John Evans told
the tribes that they should relocate to Fort Lyon in the Colorado Territory.62
At his behest, the tribes did so, and set up their camp at the nearby Sand
Creek, where they flew an American flag with a white flag of truce beneath
it.63 Nonetheless, John Chivington, a colonel in the United States Army,
conspired with Evans to order an unprovoked attack on the peaceful
camp.64 The details of the attack are appalling. Before the first shots were
fired, Lieutenant Luther Wilson took companies of the Colorado First and
Third Cavalries to disperse a nearby herd of horses in order to prevent
escape.65 The ensuing slaughter lasted from sunrise until three in the
57. Id. at 893.
58. Id. (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688
(1949)).
59. Id. at 912.
60. Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity
and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 602 (2003)
(“‘[S]overeign immunity’ . . . underlies and permeates the question of federal governmental
liability in court. For any suit against the United States or its agencies to survive a motion to
dismiss, a claimant must find a specific statute that waives the sovereign immunity of the
government . . . .”).
61. Treaty Between the Arapaho and Cheyenne Indians of the Upper Arkansas River,
arts. 1, 4, Feb. 18, 1861, 12 Stat. 1163.
62. Flute, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1180-81 (D. Colo. 2014).
63. Id. at 1181.
64. Id.
65. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9, Flute, 808 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2015) (No. 141405), 2014 WL 7212984, at *9.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

992

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:985

afternoon.66 Although the exact number of dead remains unknown,
eyewitnesses reported that a majority of the victims were women and
children.67
In the aftermath of the massacre, Colonel Chivington resigned his
commission and the United States House of Representatives ordered a
committee to investigate the incident.68 The committee’s report ultimately
led to the Treaty of Little Arkansas,69 signed in 1865, which provides:
The United States being desirous to express its condemnation of,
and, as far as may be, repudiate the gross and wanton out-rages
perpetrated against certain bands of Cheyenne and Arapahoe
Indians . . . will grant three hundred and twenty acres of land by
patent to each of the following-named chiefs of said bands . . .
and will in like manner grant to each other person of said bands
made a widow, or who lost a parent upon that occasion, one
hundred and sixty acres of land, the names of such persons to be
ascertained under the direction of the Secretary of the
Interior . . . . The United States will also pay in United States
securities, animals, goods, provisions, or such other useful
articles as may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior,
be deemed best adapted to the respective wants and conditions of
the persons named in the schedule hereto annexed . . . .70
The following year, Congress appropriated money to fund these promises.
The 1866 Indian Appropriations Act provides:
For reimbursing members of the bands of Arapaho and
Cheyenne Indians who suffered at Sand Creek, November
twenty-ninth, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, to be paid in
United States securities, animals, goods, provisions, or such
66. Flute, 67 F. Supp. 3d. at 1181.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. On October 28, 1867, the tribes and the United States entered into the Treaty of
Medicine Lodge Creek, which “purported to establish a new reparations scheme.” Flute, 808
F.3d at 1238 n.3. The Plaintiffs argued that the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek was never
concluded, and that the Treaty of Little Arkansas controlled the case. Id. The court did not
necessarily accept the Plaintiffs’ assertion, but determined that the validity of the Treaty of
Medicine Lodge Creek did not affect its analysis. Id. Consequently, it focused on the Treaty
of Little Arkansas. Id.
70. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Cheyenne and Arapahoe
Tribes of Indians, art. 6, Oct. 14, 1865, 14 Stat. 703 [hereinafter 1865 Treaty with the
Cheyenne and Arapaho].
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other useful articles as the Secretary of the Interior may direct, as
per sixth article treaty of October fourteenth, eighteen hundred
and sixty-five, thirty-nine thousand and fifty dollars.71
Instead of distributing the funds to the specific individuals named in the
treaty, however, the Department of the Interior (DOI) distributed some of
the money directly to the tribes and returned the rest as “surplus.”72 The
DOI has never attempted to identify the individuals owed reparations.
Further, it has never completed an accounting of the reparations distributed,
withheld, and still owed.73
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs, citizens of Oklahoma and members of federally recognized
tribes, filed a class action in federal court on behalf of themselves and other
descendants of the Sand Creek Massacre.74 They named the BIA,75 the
Department of the Interior, and the United States as defendants.76 The
Plaintiffs alleged that the United States served as trustee of the funds
promised in the Treaty of Little Arkansas and appropriated in the 1866
Indian Appropriations Act.77 They further alleged that the United States
breached its trust obligations by failing to provide an accounting.78 The
Plaintiffs “expressly disavowed any claim for damages”79 and instead
sought an accounting of the reparation payments and an award of funds still
owed.80 At the district court, the Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).81 The district court
concluded that the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity and
thus granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.82

71. 1866 Indian Appropriations Act, ch. 266, 14 Stat. 255, 276.
72. Flute, 67 F. Supp. at 1182-83.
73. Id. at 1183.
74. Id.
75. Created in 1849, the BIA was initially placed within the Department of the Army
and later moved to the Department of the Interior, where it oversaw responsibility of Indian
affairs on behalf of the federal government. Id. at 1180.
76. Id. at 1178.
77. Flute, 808 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2015).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1242 n.6.
80. Flute, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 1180.
81. Id. at 1183.
82. Id. at 1188.
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C. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered two issues. First, whether the
United States had waived its sovereign immunity. 83 And second, whether a
trust relationship existed between the Plaintiffs and the United States.84 It
answered both questions in the negative and affirmed the dismissal.85
The Plaintiffs argued that the United States waived its sovereign
immunity in a statute appropriating money to the DOI. 86 Title I of The
Department of the Interior, Environment, And Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2010 (“DOI Appropriation Act”) provides:
[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the statute of
limitations shall not commence to run on any claim, including
any claim in litigation pending on the date of the enactment of
this Act, concerning losses to or mismanagement of trust funds,
until the affected tribe or individual Indian has been furnished
with an accounting of such funds from which the beneficiary can
determine whether there has been a loss . . . .87
According to the Plaintiffs, this language both tolled the statute of
limitations until they received an accounting and waived sovereign
immunity.88 The court disagreed. Because a waiver of sovereign immunity
must be expressed unequivocally,89 and because nothing in the DOI
Appropriation Act even mentioned sovereign immunity, the court
concluded that the United States had not consented to be sued.90
In arguing otherwise, the Plaintiffs relied on Shoshone Indian Tribe of
Wind River Reservation v. United States.91 There, Indian tribes filed a
lawsuit against the United States, alleging that the United States had
breached its trust obligations by mismanaging the tribes’ sand and gravel
resources.92 The government argued that the claim was barred by the
applicable six-year statute of limitations,93 while the tribes maintained that
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Flute, 808 F.3d at 1240.
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1247.
Id. at 1240.
Pub. L. No. 111-88, tit. I, 123 Stat. 2904, 2922 (2009).
Flute, 808 F.3d at 1240.
United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992).
Flute, 808 F.3d at 1240.
364 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Shoshone II).
Id. at 1341.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012).
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the DOI Appropriation Act94 tolled it.95 The Federal Circuit agreed with the
tribe, holding that “[b]y the plain language of the [DOI Appropriation] Act,
Congress has expressly waived its sovereign immunity and deferred the
accrual of the Tribes' cause of action until an accounting is provided.”96
In Flute, the Plaintiffs used this language to argue that the DOI
Appropriation Act waived sovereign immunity for their claim as well. 97
Again, the Tenth Circuit disagreed. Although it admitted that the Federal
Circuit’s language was “imprecise,” the court examined the context of
Shoshone II to clarify the language’s meaning.98 The claims in Shoshone II
arose under the Tucker Act99 and the Indian Tucker Act,100 statutes that
each contained an express waiver of sovereign immunity.101 In Shoshone I,
the Federal Circuit determined that sovereign immunity had been waived
under those statutes,102 while the issue in Shoshone II was the applicable
statute of limitations.103 The Tenth Circuit concluded that in Flute, unlike in
the Shoshone litigation, the Plaintiffs could not identify any waiver of
sovereign immunity other than the DOI Appropriation Act.104 Finally, the
court noted that even if the Plaintiffs correctly interpreted the Federal
Circuit’s holding, it would still refuse to follow that holding because of the
long-established rule that waivers of sovereign immunity must be
unequivocal.105
In their jurisdictional statement, the Plaintiffs in Flute asserted that “[t]he
District Court's jurisdiction in this case arises from 5 U.S.C. § 702.”106 This
provision was never cited again, nor did the Plaintiffs explain how it
conferred jurisdiction. In a footnote, the court concluded that this “passing
reference” would not be considered because the Plaintiffs had provided no

94. Shoshone II involved the 2003 version of the DOI Appropriation Act, while the
present case involves the 2009 version. The relevant language is the same.
95. Shoshone II, 364 F.3d at 1344.
96. Id. at 1346.
97. Flute, 808 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2015).
98. Id.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012) (as amended).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012) (as amended).
101. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1241.
102. Shoshone Indian Tribe v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 60, 62 (2001) (Shoshone I).
103. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1241.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1242 (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992)).
106. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Flute, 808 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2015) (No. 141405), 2014 WL 7212984, at *1.
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argument nor reasoned analysis to support their assertion.107 The court also
stated that § 702 does not operate to waive sovereign immunity for any
claim that accrued before the provision’s effective date of October 21,
1976.108
The Tenth Circuit based the dismissal on its conclusion that the United
States had not waived sovereign immunity, but the court also held that even
if sovereign immunity had been waived, the jurisdictional defect would
remain because no trust relationship existed between the Plaintiffs and the
United States.109 The DOI Appropriation Act applies only to claims
“concerning losses to or mismanagement of trust funds.”110 The court
determined that because the Act requires a trust relationship and no trust
relationship existed, any purported waiver of sovereign immunity in the Act
was inapplicable to the Plaintiffs.111
The court’s central conclusion regarding the existence of a trust
relationship was, “The Government's Assumption of the Fiduciary Duties
Associated with a Trust Relationship Must Be Established by Express
Statutory or Regulatory Language,”112 and that the Plaintiffs had failed to
identify any such language.113 According to the Plaintiffs, the Treaty of
Little Arkansas and the 1866 Appropriations Act established the United
States’ fiduciary obligations.114 The court rejected this argument, relying in
part on the fact that “neither the treaty nor the 1866 Appropriations Act
contain[ed] any express trust language.”115 It reasoned that nothing in either
source indicated congressional intent to create an ongoing fiduciary
obligation, but instead the treaty and the Act created the obligation for a
one-time payment.116 After considering the Mitchell cases, it contrasted
Flute with Mitchell II by finding that neither the treaty nor the Act
contemplated elaborate governmental control of tribal property.117

107. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1240 n.4.
108. Id. (citing United States v. Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co., 81 F.3d 922, 929 n.8 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
109. Id. at 1242.
110. Pub. L. No. 111-88, tit. I, 123 Stat. 2904, 2922 (2009).
111. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1243.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1245.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1245-46.
116. Id. at 1246.
117. Id.
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Similarly, it found that, unlike Mitchell II, there was no directive for the
government to manage the property for the best interests of the Indian.118
Judge Phillips concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the United States
had not waived sovereign immunity, but disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion that no trust relationship existed.119 In his view, the majority
placed “undue emphasis on the absence of express trust language.”120 He
analyzed the Mitchell cases as well, concluding that the Supreme Court
values “function over form.”121 Instead of requiring specific language, he
argued, the Court looks at the level of comprehensive control and inquires
whether the government was invested with the responsibility to secure the
“best interests of the Indian.”122 He determined that the treaty, in directing
the Secretary of the Interior to pay the tribes in securities and provisions in
a way best adapted to their condition, invested the government with control
over tribal property and invested the Secretary with enough discretion that a
trust relationship existed.123 According to Judge Phillips, the United States
currently holds the Plaintiffs’ money in trust.124 Nevertheless, the dismissal
was affirmed and on October 3, 2016, the Supreme Court denied a writ of
certiorari.125
IV. Section 702: An Alternative Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
The Tenth Circuit correctly rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that an act
tolling the statute of limitations also waives sovereign immunity. The wellestablished rule that “waivers of the Government’s sovereign immunity, to
be effective, must be ‘unequivocally expressed’”126 leads to only one
outcome when the purported waiver of sovereign immunity does not
actually mention sovereign immunity. Section 702 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, however, does expressly waive sovereign immunity, and
provides a reasonable pathway for future plaintiffs in similar situations.
Again, § 702 provides:

118. Id.
119. Id. at 1247 (Phillips, J., concurring).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1248 (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 507-08 (2003)).
123. Id. at 1249.
124. Id. at 1248 n.2.
125. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1234 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 146 (2016).
126. United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

998

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:985

A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief
other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or
an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official
capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed
nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the
United States . . . .127
In order for § 702 to be applicable to the Plaintiffs’ claim, it must be
demonstrated that a trust relationship existed between the Plaintiffs and the
United States,128 that the Plaintiffs suffered a legal wrong or were adversely
affected by agency action, and that the Plaintiffs sought relief other than
monetary damages.
First, contrary to the holding of the Tenth Circuit, a trust relationship
existed between the Plaintiffs and the United States. The Mitchell cases
hold that to demonstrate a trust relationship, the tribe must identify a source
of substantive law that imposes a fiduciary obligation on the government.129
This obligation attaches when the government assumes control of tribal
property for tribal benefit.130 Here, the Treaty of Little Arkansas and the
1866 Appropriations Act imposed a fiduciary duty on the United States.
The Secretary of the Interior was given complete control of the $39,050
appropriated by the Act, and as in Mitchell II, exercised managerial control
over it. This control was demonstrated when the DOI took possession of the
funds and distributed them to the wrong people. Unlike in Mitchell I, the
tribal members had no ability to use the property. Instead, the United States
had complete control of the tribal property and the Secretary was directed to
manage it for tribal benefit. A key fact in finding a trust relationship in
Mitchell II was the statutory directive that sales of timber “be based upon a
consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian . . . .”131 Despite
the Tenth Circuit’s assertion otherwise,132 here also the Secretary was
127. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
128. Flute, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1184 (D. Colo. 2014) (“In order to determine
whether . . . the APA . . . waives defendants' sovereign immunity, the Court must determine
whether plaintiffs have identified a source for defendants' alleged trust responsibilities.”).
129. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
131. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 209 (1983) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 406(a)).
132. Flute, 808 F.3d 1234, 1246 (10th Cir. 2015) (“And unlike Mitchell II, there is
nothing in either the treaty or the 1866 Appropriations Act that contemplates the
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invested with the authority and responsibility to act in the best interest of
the tribes. The treaty provided: “The United States will also pay in United
States securities, animals, goods, provisions, or such other useful articles as
may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, be deemed best
adapted to the respective wants and conditions of the persons
named . . . .”133
In addition, the lack of express trust language is not dispositive. Judge
Phillips correctly noted that the Supreme Court values “function over
form.”134 In requiring express trust language, the Tenth Circuit applied a
heightened standard contrary to Supreme Court precedent. The Court’s
position on this issue seems clear. In Mitchell I, the relevant statute
provided “that the United States does and will hold the land thus allotted,
for the period of twenty-five years, in trust,”135 and the Court found that
there was not a trust relationship.136 Conversely in Mitchell II, the Court
found a trust relationship despite the total absence of any express trust
language.137
Second, the Plaintiffs suffered a legal wrong because of “agency action.”
As an initial matter, when judicial review is sought under a general review
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act rather than a substantive
statute, the agency action must be final.138 “Agency action” is “the whole or
a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or
denial thereof, or failure to act.”139 An agency action is “final” if it “mark[s]
the ‘consummation’ of the agency's decisionmaking process”140 and is “one
by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal
government's management of Indian property under an elaborate regulatory scheme which
directs the government to do so in the best interests of the current and future beneficiaries of
the proceeds from the resources on that property.”).
133. 1865 Treaty with the Cheyenne and Arapaho, supra note 70, at art. 6, 14 Stat. 703
(emphasis added).
134. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1247 (Phillips, J., concurring).
135. Pub. L. No. 49-119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 348) (emphasis added).
136. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980).
137. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
138. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990). But see Presbyterian
Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 523-26 (9th Cir. 1989); Reno v. Am.-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 510 n.4 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“This
waiver of immunity [§ 702] is not restricted by the requirement of final agency action that
applies to suits under the Administrative Procedure Act.”).
139. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 882 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(13)).
140. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Chicago S. Airlines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp, 33 U.S. 103, 133 (1948)).
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consequences will flow.’”141 Here, the Secretary of the Interior’s failure to
follow the directives of the Treaty of Little Arkansas and the 1866
Appropriations Act constitutes “final agency action.” The DOI’s failure to
pay the appropriated funds to the individuals named in the treaty was the
conclusion of a decision-making process regarding who would receive the
appropriated funds. This process also determined the rights of the named
individuals to receive that which they were promised. Moreover, this
agency action caused the Plaintiffs to suffer a legal wrong. “[A] treaty is in
its nature a contract between two nations . . . .”142 In failing to abide by the
terms of the treaty it signed, the United States breached its promise to the
Tribes. This breach ultimately caused the Plaintiffs’ ancestors to be
deprived of money that they were legally entitled to.
Finally, the Plaintiffs sought relief “other than monetary damages.” The
Plaintiffs sought only an accounting of the reparation payments owed and
an award of those funds.143 They “expressly disavowed any claim for
damages.”144 An accounting of the reparation payments is certainly not a
claim for monetary damages, and as Bowen v. Massachusetts145
demonstrates, an award of funds still owed is not a claim for monetary
damages either. Again, in allowing Massachusetts to bring suit under § 702,
the Supreme Court held that “the recovery of specific property or monies”
is not a claim for monetary damages.146 Monetary damages provide a victim
with compensation for an injury; the recovery of specific money is an
action for equitable relief.147 Here, the Plaintiffs were not seeking
compensation for an injury; instead, they sought to recover a specific
amount of money already owed. Indeed, that is why an accounting is so
important: without a proper accounting, the specific amount of money owed
cannot be determined.
The Tenth Circuit has already determined that the payment of specific
money owed to descendants of tribal members is not a claim for monetary
damages. In Fletcher v. United States, members of the Osage Tribe sued the
United States, claiming that the United States had failed to pay them certain
141. Id. (quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaquet
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
142. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 391 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 254 (1829)).
143. Flute, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1180 (D. Colo. 2014).
144. Flute, 808 F.3d 1234, 1242, n.6 (10th Cir. 2015).
145. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
146. Id. at 893.
147. Id.
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oil and gas royalties.148 The Osage Allotment Act,149 passed in 1906,
provided that each tribal member was to receive an interest in the tribe’s
mineral estate.150 Plaintiffs, descendants of those on the tribal membership
rolls when the Allotment Act was passed, alleged that the United States
breached its trust obligations by allowing the alienation of mineral royalties
to non-members of the tribe.151 The United States asserted sovereign
immunity,152 but the court determined that waiver occurred under § 702.153
It analyzed Bowen v. Massachusetts and concluded that an order directing
the United States to comply with the Allotment Act and pay specific
royalties was not an action for monetary damages.154
Because the Flute Plaintiffs suffered a legal wrong due to the DOI’s
actions and because they sought relief other than monetary damages, § 702
should have provided a waiver of sovereign immunity. The Tenth Circuit
did not even consider these arguments, and instead stated that § 702 does
not apply to any claim that accrued before its effective date of October 21,
1976.155 This assertion, however, does not comport with other federal
circuits that have more thoroughly addressed the issue.
For example, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly held that § 702 is
applicable to claims arising prior to 1976. In Hill v. United States, a
government employee sued the United States, alleging that he had been
unlawfully denied classification to a higher civil service grade.156 The
employee was terminated in 1969 and the action was commenced in
1973,157 well before the relevant amendment to § 702 in 1976. The court
discussed Bradley v. Richmond School Board, where the Supreme Court
held that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is a

148. 160 F. App’x 792, 796 (10th Cir. 2005). This case returned to the Tenth Circuit in
2013, where it reversed the district court’s dismissal. Fletcher v. United States, 730 F.3d
1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2013).
149. Pub. L. No. 59-321, 34 Stat. 539 (1906).
150. Fletcher, 160 F. App’x at 793.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 795.
153. Id. at 797.
154. Id. at 796-97.
155. Flute, 808 F.3d 1234, 1239 n.4 (10th Cir. 2015).
156. 571 F.2d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 1978).
157. Id. at 1102 n.6.
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statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.”158 Because the
legislative history was silent regarding the provision’s retroactive effect,
and because no manifest injustice would result by applying a voluntary
waiver of sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit applied § 702 to a claim
that arose in 1969.159
The D.C. Circuit has also applied § 702 to claims that accrued prior to
1976. In Cobell v. Norton, beneficiaries of Individual Indian Money (IIM)
trust accounts brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior.160 They
alleged a breach of fiduciary obligation and sought a historical accounting
of the funds held in trust.161 The General Allotment Act of 1887162 divided
tribal land into distinct parcels and allotted those parcels to individual tribal
members.163 The United States, as trustee, acquired beneficial title to
allotted land for a period of twenty-five years, after which fee patent would
issue to the individual tribal owner.164 The Indian Reorganization Act of
1934165 ended the allotment of tribal lands, but the federal government
retained indefinite control of any parcel that had been allotted but not yet
fee-patented.166 The funds produced from these trust lands created the IIM
accounts at the center of the case,167 and these accounts were severely
mismanaged from their inception.168 The court found that the trusts at issue
were formed when the United States acquired beneficial title to the allotted

158. Id. at 1102 (quoting Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974));
accord Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 76-77 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102
(1974).
159. Hill, 571 F.2d at 1102.
160. 240 F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
161. Id. at 1093.
162. The Act is often referred to as the “Dawes Act.” Pub. L. No. 49-119, 24 Stat. 338
(1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331).
163. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087.
164. Id.
165. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461).
166. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-AIMD-93-4, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT: BIA'S MANAGEMENT OF THE INDIAN TRUST FUNDS (1993); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-AIMD-94-99, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: STATUS OF BIA'S
EFFORTS TO RECONCILE INDIAN TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS AND IMPLEMENT MANAGEMENT
IMPROVEMENTS (1994); COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, MISPLACED TRUST: THE BUREAU OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS' MISMANAGEMENT OF THE INDIAN TRUST FUND, H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 23 (1992).
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land under the General Allotment Act of 1887.169 All trustees have a
fiduciary duty to maintain records and provide an accounting of the trust
corpus if the beneficiary so requests.170 By failing to do so, the United
States breached its fiduciary duty.171 Notably, even though the
mismanagement of the trust accounts giving rise to the claim occurred well
before the enactment of § 702,172 the court determined that § 702 operated
to waive sovereign immunity.173 The court did not limit the claim to
mismanagement that had occurred after 1976, but instead ordered an
accounting of all IIMs created by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.174
The Tenth Circuit itself has arguably already applied § 702 to waive
sovereign immunity to claims that accrued prior to 1976. In Fletcher v.
United States, the Osage Allotment Act, enacted in 1906, created the tribal
mineral interests.175 As discussed above, the tribal members alleged the
United States breached its trust obligations by allowing alienation of these
mineral interests to non-members of the tribe.176 Between 1906, when the
Act was passed, and 1978, when alienation was proscribed by Congress,
nearly one-third of the tribe’s oil and gas rights were alienated.177 In
deciding that § 702 waived sovereign immunity, the court did not address
retroactivity. Moreover, it neither inquired into the dates of each specific
alienation nor limited the case only to those that took place after 1976.
Instead, it allowed all claims, even those based on alienation occurring prior
to 1976, to proceed. Fletcher, however, is distinguishable from Flute in one
sense. At oral argument in Fletcher, the plaintiffs’ counsel stated that the
tribal members did not seek repayment of royalties that had been withheld
in the past, but only sought royalties accruing from the date that the

169. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1086 (“The trusts at issue here were created over one hundred
years ago through an act of Congress, and have been mismanaged nearly as long.”).
170. 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 83 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (“A trustee has a
duty to maintain clear, complete, and accurate books and records regarding the trust property
and the administration of the trust, and, at reasonable intervals on request, to provide
beneficiaries with reports or accountings.”).
171. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1107, 1110.
172. Id. at 1086 (“The trusts at issue here were created over one hundred years ago
through an act of Congress, and have been mismanaged nearly as long.”).
173. Id. at 1094.
174. Id. at 1110.
175. Fletcher v. United States, 160 F. App’x 792, 793 (10th Cir. 2005).
176. Id.
177. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 6-7, Fletcher, 160 F. App’x at 793 (No. 04-5112),
2005 WL 3986894.
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complaint was filed.178 Nonetheless, although the remedy in Fletcher
related to a point in time after the effective date of § 702, at least some of
the harm giving rise to that remedy occurred prior to the provision’s
enactment.
In Flute, a trust relationship existed between the Plaintiffs and the United
States because the Secretary of the Interior exercised managerial control
over the funds appropriated by the 1866 Appropriations Act and was
directed to do so in the best interests of the tribes. The Secretary’s failure to
do so constituted agency action and caused a legal harm. The Plaintiffs’
attempt to receive an accounting of these funds and recover any funds still
owed is not an action for monetary damages because it is neither
compensatory nor punitive, but is instead equitable and seeks to recover
specific money. And, the fact that this claim accrued prior to 1976 is not
material. Accordingly, § 702 operated to waive the sovereign immunity of
the United States in this case.
V. Conclusion
In its brief, the United States began its statement of the case as follows:
In all of American history there is no episode more contemptible
nor more abhorrent than the depredations of the United States
cavalry on the banks of Sand Creek in Colorado Territory during
the early morning hours of November 29, 1864. The “Sand
Creek Massacre” was a tragedy and a disgrace.179
It then went on to make a number of technical arguments with the ultimate
goal of avoiding its indisputable moral responsibility to compensate for
those “depredations.” This is particularly egregious because that the United
States also signed a document which created an additional legal
responsibility to provide compensation.
This Note aimed to outline a reasonable and justified pathway that the
Plaintiffs in Flute could have followed to get their case to trial. Even if one
finds that pathway unpersuasive, is there not a marked difference between
whether the United States can assert sovereign immunity and whether it
should? As Justice Black noted in his oft-quoted dissent, “Great nations,

178. Fletcher, 160 F. App’x at 797.
179. Response Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 2, Flute, 808 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir.
2015) (No. 14-1405), 2015 WL 1275679.
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like great men, should keep their word.”180 Bearing in mind how much
money was spent litigating this very case, and that the United States could
potentially avoid paying any pre-judgment interest,181 it stands to reason
that the treasury could endure the $39,050 appropriated for the
reparations.182 Consider that Congress has recently awarded $683,600 to the
Virginia Commission for the Arts to help produce silent adaptations of
Shakespeare’s plays.183
The Supreme Court has endorsed the view that
[T]he doctrine [of sovereign immunity] may be satisfactory to
technicians but not at all to persons whose main concern is with
justice . . . . The trouble with the sovereign immunity doctrine is
that it interferes with consideration of practical matters, and
transforms everything into a play on words. In our judgment a
fair consideration of practical matters supports the conclusion
that the district courts and the regional courts of appeals have
jurisdiction to review agency action of the kind involved in these
cases . . . .184
For those whose main concern is with justice, a fair consideration of the
practical matters in Flute supports the conclusion that because the Plaintiffs
have been wronged by the United States, they should have the ability to
seek redress in its courts.
Alexander Sokolosky

180. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
181. United States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util. Dist., 28 F.3d 1544, 1553 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that an award of prejudgment interest “rests within the sound discretion of the
court”) (quoting Home Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gilliam, 952 F.2d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 1991)).
182. 1866 Indian Appropriations Act, ch. 266, 14 Stat. 255, 267.
183. JAMES LANKFORD, FEDERAL FUMBLES: 100 WAYS THE GOVERNMENT DROPPED THE
BALL 10 (2015), https://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Federal_Fumbles_ 2015.
pdf (questioning whether Polonius was right when he said in Hamlet, “Give every man thy
ear, but few thy voice”); James Bovard, A Silenced Shakespeare in Washington, WALL ST. J.
(July 13, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-silenced-shakespeare-in-washington-14368
25550?alg=y.
184. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 912 (1988) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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